ASYMMETRIC PARTNERSHIP IN DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE: EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE AND LEGISLATIVE NEGOTIATION IN PROVINCIAL POLICYMAKING

This study examines executive–legislative relations in decentralized governance through the concept of asymmetric partnership in provincial policymaking. Although decentralization is normatively designed to strengthen horizontal checks and balances between executive and legislative institutions, empirical practices frequently reveal persistent executive dominance within subnational governance processes. Existing studies on Indonesian regional governance have largely focused on institutional arrangements and formal authority, while providing limited explanation of how negotiation processes, coalition dynamics, and agenda-setting practices reproduce asymmetrical policymaking relations. Using a qualitative explanatory case study approach, this research analyzes the formulation of two strategic provincial regulations—Water Resources Management and Transportation Governance—in Central Java during the 2024–2025 legislative period. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with executive officials, legislators, legislative staff, bureaucratic actors, and policy stakeholders, complemented by document analysis and non-participant observation. The study integrates the Advocacy Coalition Framework and Multiple Streams Framework to examine coalition alignment, policy timing, and executive–legislative interaction within decentralized governance. The findings demonstrate that executive dominance operates beyond formal institutional authority through control over technical expertise, agenda-setting processes, bureaucratic coordination, and policy timing. Legislative negotiation occurs within constrained institutional spaces and primarily focuses on procedural adjustments and implementation safeguards rather than substantive policy redesign. Executive actors further consolidate dominance through coalition alignment with technocratic experts, bureaucratic networks, and supportive political factions. The study also finds that the degree of asymmetry varies across policy sectors depending on public scrutiny, policy urgency, and coalition density. This article contributes to decentralized governance scholarship by conceptualizing executive–legislative relations as an asymmetric partnership sustained through negotiation, informational asymmetry, and coalition coordination. More broadly, the findings demonstrate that decentralization may reproduce rather than eliminate unequal policymaking relations within subnational democratic governance.